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Introduction
Sometimes in the course of practicing law,
attorneys learn of substantial transactions conducted in the medium of currency. Indeed, to
those attorneys with active residential real estate
practices, as well as those who represent buyers
and sellers of small businesses, cash transactions
are a familiar-albeit often unseen-occurrence.
On occasion, counsel's advice may be sought as
to whether all or part of the currency should be
deposited. Alerted by newspaper articles to the
IRS reporting requirements for cash transactions
in excess of $10,000, clients may seek specific
advice regarding the information required by the
reports, the possible consequences of filing of
such reports, and the means (and legality) by
which currency can be deposited without "triggering" the reporting requirements.
Practitioners who are not familiar with the
IRS currency transaction reporting requirements
and recent case law on this subject may advise
their clients to "structure" deposits so that none
exceed $10,000 individually. However, counsel
should realize that, as part of the government's
intensifying war on the use of "money laundering" by tax evaders, narcotics traffickers and
organized crime figures, instances of structured
deposits have recently been prosecuted as criminal
"evasions" of the reporting requirements. Al-
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though the few reported cases on the subject, are
in clear conflict, there appears to be a growing
tendency on the part of the IRS to investigate
and on the part of the Department of Justice
to prosecute individuals engaged in currency
transactions designed to avoid reporting requirements.
In view of these de4 elopments and in the
absence of a decision, in the area by the United
States Supreme Court 'it''is essential that all
practitioners be keenly' aware that their advice
to clients regarding the propriety of structuring
deposits to avoid the reporting requirements may
subsequently become the subject of governmental
scrutiny. More importantly, such- advice by an
attorney may even, Se viewed as violative of the
federal criminM laws.
This article presents an overview of the law
and regulations regarding the reporting requirements 'for. currency transactions in excess of
$10,000: inaddition, it discusses the. -issues which
may arlse as a result of advising clients to conduct currency transactions in a structured fashion.

Overview of Law and RegulationS
The Currency Transaction Reporting Act,
31 U. S. C. § 5311 et seq., authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require domestic' financial
institutions, and any other participants in transactions for the "payment, receipt or transfer
of United States coin or currency," to report
such transactions to the Secretary. The Secretary has issued regulations requiring financiil
institutions to file reports of each 'deposit, withdrawal, exchange or transfer which involves a
transaction in currency of more than $10,000.2
The form prepared by the Treasury Department
for use by financial institutions, Form 4789 (Currency Transaction Report) ("CTR").,. seeks the
name, address, Social Security number and oC
cupation of the person conducting, the transaction, the same information of anyone conducting a
transaction on behalf of another individual, along
with certain information. verifyirg,the idenfification, e.g., driver's permit, passport, alien identi3
fication card.
CTRs must be filed with the Internal Revenue Service, where ultimaiely they may.be reviewed by Special Agents of the IRS's Criminal
Investigation Division. These reports have been
a prime source of criminal tax -investigations.
Pursuant to 31 U. S. C. § 532 2 (a), a willful
violation by an individual of a fegulation promulgated under the Act is subject to a fine of ndt
more than $250,000, imprisonment for not more
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than five years, or both.' In addition, a person
willfully violating a regulation "while violating
another law of the United States or as part of
illegal activity involving transactions of more
than $100,000 in a 12-month period" is subject
to a fine of not more than $500,000, imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.'
Neither the Act nor the regulations speak
directly of an obligation on the part of a financial
institution-or anyone else-to "aggregate" multiple deposits in amounts of less than $10,000
individually in order to trigger the reporting
requirement. Ostensibly then, a bank could
knowingly participate in multiple currency transactions without triggering the regulations' re'31 U. S. C. § 5313(a) states:
When a domestic financial institution is involved
in a transaction for the payment, receipt, or transfer
of United States coins or currency (or other monetary instruments the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes), in an amount, denomination, or amount and
denomination, or under circumstances the Secretary
prescribes by regulation, the institution and any
other participant in -the transaction the Secretary
may prescribe shall file a report on the transaction
at the time and in the way the Secretary prescribes.
A participant acting for another pei'son shall make
the reportas the agent or bailee of the person and
identify the person for. whom the transaction is
being 'made".
'31 C. F. R. 103.22(a) provides:
Each financial institution . . . shall file a report
of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of. currency
or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such
financial institution, which involves a transaction in
currency of more than $10,000. Such reports shall
"
be made on forms 'prescribed by the Secretary .
and all information called for iii the forms shall be
furnished....
'A copy of an IRS Form 4789 is reproduced in Fink,
Tax Fraud, App. 111-80.

'31 U. S. C. § 5322(a) states:

A person willfully violating this subchapter or a
regulation pr.tscribed tinder this subchapter . . . shall
b fined ndt more than $250,000, or [imprisoned for]
not more than five years, o" bofh.
'31 U. S. C. § 5322(b) states:
A person willfully violating this subchapter or a
regulation prescribed under this subchapter . . . while
violating another law of the United States or as part
of a pattern of illegal activity involving transactions
of more than $100,000 in a 12-month period, shall be
fined not more than $500,000, imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both.
Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3623(b), a corporation convicted of a violation of 31 U. S. C. § 5322(a) or 31
U. S. C. § 5322(b) may be fined not more than $500,000.
Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3623(c)(1), if a defendant
(individual or corporate) derives pecuniary gain from
the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to
another person, the defendant may be fined not more
than the greater, of twice the gross gain or twice the
gross loss. In addition, an act which is indictable under
the Currency Transaction Reporting Act may constitute
"racketeering activity" within the meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),
18 U. S. C. § 196i, et seq.
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quirements so long as no single transaction was
in excess of $10,000. Indeed, the only suggestion
to the contrary (aside from recent case law)
appears as part of the "General Instructions" on
the reverse side of the Form 4789 (Rev: December, 1985), which states that "[m]ultiple transactions by or for any person which in any one
day total more than $10,000 should be treated as
a single transaction, if the financial institution
is aware of them." 6 However, such instructions
are not part of the Code of Federal Regulations
and are thus not binding on financial institutions.
In addition, the regulations plainly state that
the obligation to file a CTR rests on the financial
institution-not the customer. No authority has
ever indicated that a customer has any obligation to prepare or file a CTR. Accordingly, the
absence of any duty on the part of a bank to
aggregate transactions or on the part of a customer to file CTRs would presumably lead even
the most cautious attorney to the conclusion that
a customer could properly structure cash deposits to avoid having a bank file a CTR. 7 However, judicial decisions on this subject cast doubt
on the validity of such a conclusion.

Criminal Liability Upheld as to a
Financial Institution's Employee
In 1979, the' United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that a bank officer who
participated in a structured currency transaction
to avoid the reporting requirements violated the
criminal provisions of the Reporting Act.
In United States v. Thompson,8 the chairman
of a Texas bank was indicted for causing the
bank to fail to file a CTR. At trial, the government proved that Thompson, acting on behalf
of the bank, lent $45,000 in cash to an associate
for the purpose of purchasing cocaine. In order
to avoid filing a CTR, he transferred the funds
through five separate loans, each in the amount
of $9,000.
On appeal from his conviction, Thompson
argued that he was entitled to structure the
transaction as multiple loans, even if his conduct
was designed to circumvent the bank's obligation to report the transaction. Thompson analogized his conduct to that of a taxpayer structuring
a financial transaction in a certain manner to
avoid, rather than evade, the payment of taxes.
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument as follows:
The analogy is inapposite. Congress has
lawfully required reporting of transactions

in currency of more than $10,000.00 as an
aid to criminal, tax, or regulatory proceedings. In the instant case, appellant intentionally sought to defeat the statutory
requirements by engaging in an unreported
transaction in currency of more than $10,000.00.
Appellant cannot flout the requirements of
[31 U. S. C. § 5322] with impunity. The
decision to structure a $45,000,000 transaction in currency as five $9,000,000 loans with
the intent to annul the reporting requirements does not equate to a decision to structure a financial transaction in a lawful manner
so as to minimize or avoid the applicability
of a tax covering only specific activityY
Although the Fifth Circuit held that a currency transaction could not be structured to
avoid the filing of a CTR, its holding is limited
to conduct on the part of individuals having a
duty to file such reports, i. e., employees of
banks. Nothing in the Thompson opinion suggests that a customer, who is under no obligation to comply with the Reporting Act, would
incur any liability, for example, by making five
separate deposits of currency, each in the sum
of $9,000, instead of a single $45,000 deposit, even
if this were done in connection with a similar
criminal scheme.

Criminal Liability Extended to
Customers
The first reported decision sustaining the
imposition of criminal liability on a customer who
structured a currency transaction to avoid the
filing of a CTR was United States v. TobonBuiles.10 There, the defendant and a female companion went to 10 banks in Northern Florida
over a six-hour period. At each bank they made
virtually simultaneous pairs of cash purchases of
cashier's checks, each pair totaling around
$18,000, yet each individual check for less than
$10,000. The couple used false names in identifying themselves, entered the banks separately and
used different tellers. As a result of their conduct, no CTR's were filed.
Fink, Tax Fraud, App. 111-80.1.
'Of course, if. an individual acted as a "financial institution" within the meaning of the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder, he would be responsible
for complying with the reporting requirements. See 31
U. S. C. § 5312(a)(2); 31 C. F. R. §103.11; United States
v. Goldberg, 756 F. 2d 949 (CA-2), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2706 (1985).
8603 F. 2d 1200 (CA-5 1979).
Id.'at 1203-04.
10706 F. 2d 1092 (CA-I1), reh. denied, 716 F. 2d 914
(CA-11 1983).
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Significantly, the defendant was not charged
with a violation of the Reporting Act. Rather,
the indictment charged him with a violation of
18 U. S. C. § 1001, which states in pertinent part:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme,
or device, a -materialfact . . . shall be fined

not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both. [Emphasis
added.]
The government's theory of prosecution was
that the defendant, by structuring cash purchases
of cashier's checks totaling $185,200 as a number
of smaller purchases, participated in a "trick,
scheme or device" which caused the bank to
"conceal material facts" from the Treasury Department. The "material fact" which was allegedly concealed was the "existence, source and
transfer" of the currency.
On appeal from his conviction., Tobon-Builes
argued, as the defendant in Thompson had argued,
that his conduct in intentionally structuring a
single currency transaction as smaller multiple
transactions was entirely lawful. In addition, he
argued that, since he was under no legal duty
to file CTR's, he could not be convicted of having concealed the underlying currency transaction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit rejected both arguments. In
doing so, the court relied upon Thompson for the
proposition that a currency transaction could not
be structured by a bank to avoid the filing of
CTR's. More importantly, the court also held
that the scope of criminal liability for failing
to file CTRs extended beyond those who had a
legal duty to do so under the regulations and
included those who, though under no direct obligation themselves, somehow caused financial institutions to violate their "duty" to the Treasury
Department.
The court found support for its holding in
18 U. S. C. § 2(b), a definitional provision of the
federal criminal code, which provides that one
who "willfully causes an act to be done which if
directly performed by him or another would be
an offense

. . . is punishable as a principal."

Under Section 2(b), one who causes another to
commit an offense is punishable as a principal
even though the defendant himself, i. e., the customer, did not have the capacity to commit the
crime. Similarly, under Section 2(b), a defendant
April, 1986

is punishable as a principal even though the
intermediary who actually performed the act,
i. e., the bank, had no criminal intent. Thus, the
court concluded that Tobon-Builes could be convicted under Section 1001 even though he did
not have a duty to file a CTR, and even though
the banks were unaware of his conduct. As the
court stated:
Tobon's willfullness was clearly
established by evidence showing he knew
about the currency reporting requirements
and that he purposely sought to prevent
the financial institutions from filing required
reports by using false names and by structuring his transactions under $10,000. Moreover, because of Tobon's deceptive transactions,
the financial institutions, i; e., the innocent
intermediaries, were duped into not report.ing currency transactions they would have
had a dutly to report and indeed would have
reported had they known of Tobon's scheme.
Thus, by operation of § 2(b), Tobon's
criminal intent to cause a concealment is
joined together with his innocent intermediaries'
duties to report (i. e., their capacity to commit the crime of concealment) and their
failure to report . . . to constitute the ele-

ments of
§ 1001.11

actionable

concealment

under

A Contrary View
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, under closely analogous
facts, declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit's
holding in Tobon-Builes. In United States v.
Anzalone, 2 the defendant, a bank customer, was
charged with both a violation of the Reporting
11706 F. 2d at 1101, citihg, United States. v. Ruffin,
613 F. 2d 408 (CA-2 1979). The Eleventh Circuit relied
upon its decision in Tobon-Builes in affirming the convictions of a teller and two customers in United States v.
Puerto, 730 F. 2d 627 (CA-il), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
162 (1984) (conspiracy, Reporting Act and § 1001
charges). Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit, in United
States v. Cook, 745 F. 2d 1311 (1984), cert. dehied, 105
S. Ct. i205 (1985), relied on Thompson, Toboh-Builes and
Puerto in affirming a customer's conviction on Reporting
Act charges. See also United States v. Konefal, 566 F.
Supp. 698 (N. D. N. Y. 1983) (denying motion to dismiss an indictment charging customers with conspiracy,
Reporting Act and § 1001 charges); United States v.
Sanchez-Vasquz, 585 F. Stipp. 990 (N. D. Ga. 1984)
(denying, motion to dismiss indictment charging customers with conspiracy, Reporting Act and § 1001 charges) ;
United States v. Goldberg, 587 F. Supp. 302, 308 (S. D.
N. Y.), reversed, 756 F. 2d 949(CA-2), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2706 (1985) (language suggesting that customer could incur liability; no actual discussion of issue).
2 766 F. 2d 676 (CA-1 1985).
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Act (as in Thompson), and with a violation of
18 U. S. C' § 1001 (as in Tobon-Builes).
At trial, the government proved that on
November 13, 1980, the defendant purchased
three cashier's checks from a Massachusetts bank.
The three checks totaled more than $25,000, but
none exceeded $10,000 individually. Thereafter;
between November 18, 1980 and December 1,
1980, he purchased nine additional checks totalling $75,000, again none of which exceeded
$10,000. All the checks were payable to a brokerage firm and were used to pay for bonds purchased for the account of the wife and mother
of a public* official. The bank did not file any
CTRs concerning any of these transactions.
On appeal, the defendant argued that his
conviction on the Reporting Act charge violated
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution in that the
Act and the regulations were uncohstitutionally
vague and failed to provide him with due notice
that his actions were proscribed by these provisions. In effect, the defendant argued that nothing in these provisions gave him fair warning
that structured transactions were illegal.
The First Circuit agreed. Citing the recent
admonition of the United States Supreme Court
in Kolender v. Lawson 13 that "a penal statute
[must] define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a 'manner that
does not' encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement," the First Circuit -searched the
language and legislative history of ite Reporting
Act and regulations to determine whether there
was any indicatioh of a legislative intent 'that
a- structured transaction by a customer might
constitute an illegal evasion of any reporting ;i'equirement. The court found none.
To the contrary, the Court of Appeals noted
that although 31 U. S. C. § 5313(4). authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to require reports
of financial institutions and any other participants
in the transaction, the Secretary had not done so.
As the court stated;
This would indicate to any objective
viewer that the Secretary was looking to the
Bank, not to the "other participants in the
transaction," as the source of the information
required by the Reporting Act. . . . [T]he
self-imposed limitation made upon the original power granted to the Secretary by
§ 5313(a) would at the least cause confusion
in the minds of the "other participants in the

transaction," and even more likely lead them
to conclude that they had been excluded
from its affirmative duties.1
In addition, the Court quoted at length from
a 1981 report prepared by the Comptroller General of the United States which, inter alia, admitted that even though the regulations were
silent on the propriety of a customer's conducting multiple transactions to avoid reporting, no
action had been taken to revise them. In view
of this inaction, the court stated, in words of
refreshing candor, as follows:
Although this court, like all other institutions of the United States, is supportive of the law enforcement goals of the
government and society, we cannot engage
in unprincipled interpretation of the law,
lest we foment lawlessness instead of com
pliance. This is particularly so when the
confusion and uncertainty in this law has
been caused by the government itself, and
when the solution to that situation, namely
eliminating any perceived loopholes, lies
completely within the government's control.
If the government wishes to impose a deity
on customers . . let
l it require' so in plain
langiia,&e: It should not attempt to impose
such a'd~fty by -implication', expecting 'that
the courts "will stretch statutdry; construction pastthe breaking point to accommodate
the gd 'ernment's .'interpretation.5
Accordingly, the court reversed the Reporting
Act corn.victi'n and disiissed" the: count of the
indicifnent charging a violation thereof.
he ith respect to the § 1001 czharge, the court
held that it-must also 'fail since it "depended"
upon the applicability of-the:.Relorting.Act" to a
customer. The court reasoned, as above, that
since the customer had no duty to report to the
Secretary either directly'or through the financial
institution, he hid no legl .duty to disclose the
"material facts" at 'thetime he was alleged to
have "concealed" them. Since-there was no legal
duty of disclosure, there could be no § 1001 concealment violation.
Finally, the court rejected the government's
argument that the defendant was punishable under the proVisions of 18 U. S. C. § 2(b). The
court concluded that since no crime had been
committed by either the bank or the customer,
§ 2(b) was inapposite. Accordingly, the § 1001
13461 U. S. 352 (1983).
"766 F. 2d at 681.
13 Id. at 682 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
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conviction was also reversed and the indictment
dismissed. 16

Recent Developments
On January 10, 1986, the Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Varbel," decided to follow
Anzalone and held that a customer could not be
prosecuted for structuring a currency transaction
to avoid the reporting requirements. In Varbel,
the Court of Appeals reversed convictions of
four defendants (including an attorney) on conspiracy and substantive charges relating to
"money laundering." In doing so, the court
stated :
Even though money laundering furthers
the goals of those who may be engaged in
criminal activity, it is not our function to
rewrite the law or the implementing currency
reporting regulations promulgated by the
Secretary. If Congress or the Secretary wish
to impose a reporting duty on financial institution customers, they must do so in
clear, unambiguous language. W'Ve cannot impose the duty by implication. 18
In addition, on January 16, 1986, the Eleventh
Circuit limited its prior decision in Tobon-Builes,
and reversed a customer's judgment of conviction
on a charge of violating § 1001. In United States
v. Denemark.19 the defendant purchased 14 cashier's checks from 14 different financial institutions, all of which were used in connection with
his purchase of a home in Tampa, Florida. The
checks, which totaled $154,232.50, were purchased
for cash in amounts of less than $10,000. False
names were used in purchasing the checks, and
the defendant later falsely denied purchasing all
but three of them when questioned by a Special
Agent of the United States Customs Service.
On appeal from his conviction of having violated § 1001 by using a "trick, scheme or device"
to conceal from the IRS the existence, source,
origin and transfer of the currency, Denemark
argued that since his conduct did not give rise
to a reportable transaction, he could not be
found guilty of having caused a concealment of
a material fact. Specifically, he argued that since
he, unlike the defendants in Thompson and TobonBuiles, had not transferred more than $10,000 to
any one" bank, neither he nor any of the banks
owed any duty to report any of the transactions. Accordingly, he argued, his conduct did
not fall within the wide scope of § 1001.
Despite its prior decision in Tobon-Builes,
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
April, 1986

agreed with the defendant's argument. The court
distinguished Tobon-Builes on the basis that a
reportable transaction had taken place there when
the defendant and his 'confederate bought cashier's checks each for a sum of less than $10,000
(but more than $10,000 in the aggregate) at the
same time in the same bank, which conduct gave
rise to a duty of disclosure on the part of the
defendant. In addition, the court distinguished
Thompson on the same basis, i. e., that since the
defendant's conduct in that case gave rise to a
reportable transaction, he had a duty to disclose the transaction. The court in Dencmark
concluded its analysis by holding that since there
was no transaction which would require any financial institution to file a CTR, the defendant
could not have violated a legal duty of disclosure
under § 1001.

Discussion
Although the Deneniark decision may be read
as an attempt to reconcile Tobon-Builes and the
considerations supporting the First Circuit's
decision in Anzalone, analysis demonstrates that
such reconciliation is not possible. First, -Nhile
the court in Deneniark based its decision upon the
fact that the defendant did not transfer more
than $10,000 to any one bank so as to require
any bank to report the transaction, the court in
Anzalone made no such distinction. Indeed, in
Anzalone the First Circuit rejected the notion
that a customer could incur criminal liability on
account of a structured deposit even though in
that very case the defendant purchased three
cashier's checks totaling more than $25,000 from
a single bank on the same date. More importantly, the Denemark decision implicitly holds that
a customer has a duty of disclosure under circumstances where his conduct gives rise to a
duty to report on the part of the financial institution. The court in Anzalone specifically rejected this concept.
Clearly, the conflict is irreconcilable. In the
absence of any effort on the part of the Secretary
of the Treasury to clarify the regulations, the
conflict will have to be resolved by Supreme
Court action. Indeed, the nature of the conflict
is such that compelling arguments can be advanced for both legal positions. On one hand,
the law enforcement goals which underlie an
expansive application of the Reporting Act are
"Id.
"86-1
"780
"86-1

at 683.
UsTc J9203, 780 F. 2d 758 (CA-9).
F. 2d at 762-63.
usrc 9174, 779 F. 2d 1159 (CA-11).
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laudable. On the other hand, one can feel little
sympathy for the government's position in view
of the fact that, as the court stated in Anzalone,
"the confusion and uncertainty in this law has
been caused by the government itself, and . . .
the solution to that situation . . . lies completely

within the government's control."
other factors must be considered.

20

However,

First, the view adopted by the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits is contrary to the fundamental
axiom of our legal system that criminal laws are
to be strictly construed. 2 In addition, by permitting the courts to, in effect, rewrite the regulations and thereby impose a reporting duty on
the part of a customer, the courts themselves
become subject to criticism for violating the
principle that the power to enact criminal sanctions is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department. 22 When these considerations are
weighed, the First Circuit's opinion in Anzalone
emerges as the better view.

Recommendations
Despite the clear preference expressed above,
counsel must be extremely cautious in advising
clients to structure cash transactions to avoid
the reporting requirements. In the absence of
any definitive action by the Supreme Court or
the Secretary of the Treasury, attorneys who advise their clients to do so run the risk of having
to defend themselves against charges-criminal

or disciplinary-that they advised their clients
to violate the law. The best that can be said is
that such counseling presents substantial risks
3

and, accordingly, should be avoided.2

0

F. 2d at 682.
United States v. Emmons, 410 U. S. 396 (1973).

22766
2

: In view of the recent enactment of 26 U. S. C.
§ 6050 I and the issuance of temporary regulations theretinder, the Secretary's continued failure to issue clarifying regulations under Title 31 should give the courts
additional reason to reject the government's position
as to a customer's liability tinder the existing statutes
and regulations. Under Section 6050 I, any person engaged in a trade or business who, in the course of that
trade or business, receives more than $10,000 in cash
in one transaction (or two or more related transactions)
is required to report the transaction to the IRS on a
Form 8300 within 15 days after receipt of the payment.
See Temp. Reg. § 1.6050 1-1(T). The temporary regulations require a recipient to aggregate transactions within
a 24-hour period. In addition, where there are multiple
payments relating to the same transaction or related
transactions, a report must be filed when the aggregate
exceeds $10,000 within one year of the first payment.
The regulations specifically state that "a single transaction may not be divided into multiple transactions in
order to avoid reporting under this section." Temp. Reg.
§ 1.6050 1-1 (T), Q&A 9. Although these regulations
do not apply to financial institutions, 26 U. S. C.
§6050I(c)(1)(B), and although they do not require
anything of the "payor," they do reflect an awareness
of some of the loopholes contained in the current Title
31 regulations. See, generally. Harris, "Temporary Regulations Clarify Over-$10,000 Cash Reporting, But
Leave Many Questions," 63 Journal of Taxation 138
(1985).
' This article does not discuss the issues raised by
the enactment of 26 U. S. C. § 6050 I and the promulgation of temporary regulations thereunder, which require
separate discussion.

Some Plans Amended After Compliance Dates May
Get Partial Relief
Plans disqualified for missing the
deadlines for meeting requirements added
by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the Tax Reform
Act of 1984, or the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984 may qualify for partial relief
by adopting the requisite amendments.
Corrective action must be taken by the
last day of the eleventh month following
a compliance date that fell in November
or December 1985, by the last day of
the tenth month following a compliance
date that fell in January or February
1986, or by the last day of the ninth
month following a compliance date fall-

ing after February 1986. Eligibility for
partial relief is limited to recipients of
favorable pre-compliance-date determination letters and master or prototype
plans for which favorable determination
letters have been obtained. Under the
relief provided, nonkey employees would
be treated as if the plan had always been
qualified, assets allocable to key employees would be treated as assets of
qualified plans, and a formula is provided for determining the deductible
portion of employer contributions.-Notice 86-3, CCH FEDERAL TAX MANUAL
REPORTS

Ii 7965.
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